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Secret key exchange in ultralong lasers by radiofrequency
spectrum coding
Alessandro Tonello1, Alain Barthe´le´my1, Katarzyna Krupa1, Vincent Kerme`ne1, Agne`s Desfarges-Berthelemot1,
Badr Mohamed Shalaby1,2, Sonia Boscolo3, Sergei K Turitsyn3 and Juan Diego Ania-Castan˜o´n4
Wepropose a new approach to the generation of an alphabet for secret key exchange relying on small variations in the cavity length of an
ultralong fiber laser. This new concept is supported by experimental results showing how the radiofrequency spectrum of the laser can
be exploited as a carrier to exchange information. The test bench for our proof of principle is a 50-km-long fiber laser linking two users,
Alice and Bob, where each user can randomly add an extra 1-km-long segment of fiber. The choice of laser length is driven by two
independent random binary values, whichmakes such length become itself a random variable. The security of key exchange is ensured
whenever the two independent random choices lead to the same laser length and, hence, to the same free spectral range.
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INTRODUCTION
Fiber lasers are now well-developed and reliable devices used in a wide
range of applications. As it occurs with other types of cavity resona-
tors, the confinement of light within the optical cavity of a laser allows
only a discrete number of longitudinal distributions of the electro-
magnetic field or cavity modes to build up. Such a filtering effect
features a quasiperiodic frequency response (the exact periodicity
being broken by the frequency dependence of the fiber refractive
index): the frequency spacing between neighboring modes is referred
to as the free spectral range (FSR) and scales inversely with the
cavity length. Although in this work, we consider fiber laser cavities
of a ring type using erbium-doped fibers (EDFs), our results can be
extended to different laser architectures, which may also include free-
space propagation sections provided that the overall gain exceeds the
cavity losses.
Most of the EDF laser cavities studied so far are just a few tens of
meters long, entailing a cavity mode spacing of a few megahertz.
However, it has been demonstrated that the cavity length of a fiber
laser can be extended to several hundreds of kilometers.1 This is not
surprising in fact if one thinks how low the linear losses of optical
fibers at telecommunication wavelengths are and how easily these can
be compensated by lumped or distributed optical amplifiers. The feas-
ibility of extending the laser cavity over the whole communication link
connecting the two parties, forming an ultralong fiber laser (UFL), has
raised groundbreaking possibilities in communications and particu-
larly in secure communications. An innovative concept of a key dis-
tribution system based on an erbium-doped or Raman gain UFL has
been recently proposed anddemonstrated.2–5 In this scheme, eachof the
two users (conventionally called Alice and Bob) places a randomly
chosen, spectrally selective mirror at his/her end of the fiber laser, with
the two-mirror choice representing a key bit. The security in this scheme
stems from lasing states that have lost distinguishability, from the per-
spective of a potential eavesdropper, because of their symmetry. The key
is coordinated from dynamic changes of the laser Bragg reflectors and
from lasing state characterization by the legitimate end users. As a
classical scheme, very much like chaotic lasing in coupled lasers and
algorithmic cryptography, an UFL scheme cannot be proven to be
unconditionally secure (i.e., unbreakable), contrariwise to what ideal
quantum key distribution schemes are believed to be. Instead, the UFL
scheme prospective application offers a practical and secure key distri-
bution system in which security is set from technological bounds.
Further work is required in order to fully quantify the extent of security
provided by the UFL concept. Nonetheless, such schemes offer a prac-
tical, reliable and highly secure alternative strategy for secret key
exchange, requiring only readily available, low-cost standard fiber-optic
components, and being particularly attractive in scenarios where long
ranges and fast bit rates are required.
In this paper, we propose what is, to the extent of our knowledge, a
completely newway of exchanging a secret key over anUFL link, which
relies on random changes of the FSR of the laser cavity rather than on
random changes of the cavity losses. Consequently, unlike the pre-
viously proposed UFL scheme, our laser is always above the lasing
threshold, and operates in alternating rapid transient and steady-state
modes keeping the same optical bandwidth. The key idea of our work
is based on the simple observation that the FSR of a laser cavity can be
used as an information carrier and, hence, processing the FSR traces
can make the information bits available all along the cavity. For a
cavity of tens of kilometer length scale, the FSR is only a few kilohertz
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wide. Measurement of the FSR can be performed, e.g., by a real-time
analysis of the electrical signal supplied by a photodiode that detects
one of the laser outputs. Hereafter, we will refer to this new key dis-
tribution protocol as a radiofrequency shifting key exchange (RFSKE).
Specifically, in this scheme, the FSR of the laser cavity is switched
between different values by simply adding or subtracting fiber seg-
ments of given lengths to or from the cavity. This can be easily imple-
mented by using 13N switches with N different optical fiber paths so
to change the cavity length in a predesigned way. In our implementa-
tion,N52, and two out of four possible combinations of cavity length
choices give the same value of FSR, which entails the possibility of
having an undetectable bit of information. Instead of a random inser-
tion of optical bandpass filters (BPFs), here we use the natural periodic
filtering effect of the cavity to tag the laser spectrum in a way that it
carries the information bits itself.
Switching the cavity length of a laser is a known technique used in
metrology for molecular diagnostics 6,7 or in frequency-shifted feed-
back lasers, where the cavity is modified during the course of time by
an inlinemodulator.8,9 Note also incidentally that the idea of secret key
exchange using a combination of short and long path lengths is remin-
iscent of a quantum cryptographic scheme known as the Franson
interferometer.10 However, to the best of our knowledge, the concept
of FSR coding for secret key exchange has not been considered in the
context of UFL cryptography yet.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Principle of operation
Figure 1 depicts a schematic of the UFL-based RFSKE system. The
system consists of a bidirectional, 50-km-long ring fiber laser, inwhich
in order to exchange a key bit, Alice and Bob independently choose to
add a 1-km-long segment of fiber or leave the cavity length unchanged,
with the corresponding indicator functions being ‘1’ and ‘0’, respec-
tively. Thus, the laser has a random length determined by the com-
bination of users’ choices and taking on the values: 50 km (0,0 state),
51 km (0,1 or 1,0 state) and 52 km (1,1 state), and hence, random is
also the FSR. A potential eavesdropper, Eve, measuring the FSR in the
(0,0) or (1,1) state can easily infer the corresponding cavity length
choices and therefore, the bits in these cases are rejected. However,
in the (1,0) and (0,1) states leading both to the same FSR, Eve is unable
to determine which user chose which length, thus rendering the key-
bit exchange secure. Alice, knowing her own length choice, can deter-
mine the complementary choice of Bob, and vice versa. The two of
them can therefore assign, for example, a logical ‘1’ to the (1,0) state
and a logical ‘0’ to (0,1). Note that the conditional probability of the
cavity length upon a given state is expected to be uniformly distri-
buted, and this is ensured in our experiment by a software-driven
pseudorandom number generator.
Experimental set-up
The two single-mode fiber drums in Figure 1 play the role of an
existent public infrastructure. Each of the two bays, called Alice and
Bob, provides two allowed access points to the bidirectional ring
through 90/10 tap couplers with the terminals A1, A2, and B1, B2.
Each bay has two 12-m-long segments of EDF that are core pumped
by a 980-nm diode. The schematic in Figure 1 does not show that each
diode pumps bidirectionally both EDF segments through a 50/50 fiber
coupler at 980 nm so as to maintain the symmetry for clockwise and
counterclockwise propagation in the ring. A 5-nm-wide optical BPF
centered at the fixed wavelength of 1559 nm is placed in the middle of
each bay. These filters only limit the spectral window in use and do not
play any direct role in coding. The optical power at the laser output
ports is approximately 211 dBm when the laser is operated slightly
above threshold. A ceramic switch is placed close to each fixed filter.
A transistor–transistor logic signal can reconfigure the laser by chang-
ing the state of the switch from bar to crossmode. In bar (0) mode, the
switch simply connects the main input to the main output; in cross
mode (1), the switch adds an extra propagation over 1 km of fiber in a
‘loop in loop’ set-up. A computer-generated randomnumber is sent to
a microprocessor unit (Arduino DUE) that controls the state of both
switches via two logic level shifters. The detection of the laser output is
ensured by a 1-GHz indium gallium arsenide photodiode connected
to the analog input of the same microprocessor unit that provides a
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Figure 1 Schematic of the experimental set-up. BPF, bandpass filter; EDF, erbium-doped fiber; LLS, logic level shifter; SMF, single-mode fiber.
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12-bit analog to digital conversion. The numerical Fourier transform
is then computed on the computer to obtain the FSR.
There are no polarization scrambling elements in our laser, and the
whole set-up is not acoustically isolated from the laboratory envi-
ronment. Further, we would like to note that the measurements in
our experiment are carried out in a contrived laboratory setting rather
than in a natural setting as reported in Ref. 11. The acoustic noise of
the environment contributes to produce permanent random fluctua-
tions of the instantaneous laser intensity. This important issue will be
discussed elsewhere. We note, however, that our protocol of coding is
based on shifting the radiofrequency spectrum of the laser rather than
on instantaneous time-domain on–off keying. Incidentally, coding
with frequency diversity in the presence of channel noise can be seen
as an extension of the known technique of orthogonal frequency divi-
sion multiplexing12 to ultralong laser communications.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Experimental measurements
Figure 2 depicts the optical spectra of the laser for the four possible
states as obtained frommeasurements taken close to the lasing thresh-
old. The optical bandwidth of the laser is determined by a tradeoff
between gain and losses in the cavity. To reduce the unavoidable
irregularities in the spectra due to the different spectral responses of
the switches at the different driving voltages, we included an additional
tunable 100-GHz optical BPF into the laser cavity. This filter only
makes the optical spectra more similar to each other and does not
play any role in information coding. The laser system was on hold
during the time of the optical spectrum analysis. A common feature of
all spectral profiles is a sharp peak with a 3-dB width of 0.11 nm and
located at 1560.5 nm. Importantly, the (0,1) and (1,0) states have
closely similar spectra. This would make it difficult for Eve to deduce
the states by measuring the optical spectrum.
The crucial point of the proposed RFSKE scheme lies in a fast
detection of the FSR through the analysis of the electrical signal emit-
ted by a photodiode. It is useful to recall here that the time-domain
analysis of the intensity of a light field I(t) relies on the acquisition of
the fourth-order correlation function of the field (see, e.g., Ref. 8). We
note that a change in FSR originating in a change in cavity length is
reflected by a slight frequency shift of a component or tone of the
radiofrequency spectrum of the laser. Therefore, to shorten the
acquisition time and/or to facilitate the reading of the laser states,
one can inspect those tones that are located at frequencies multiple
of the basic FSR: the higher the multiple order, the larger the tone’s
frequency shift. Because the laser radiofrequency spectrum takes the
form of a frequency comb, when the frequency shift of a given tone
exceeds the tone’s bandwidth, the corresponding change in cavity
length can easily be detected. Similarly to what happens in dual-comb
spectroscopy, however, the frequency detuning being measured
should not exceed half of the FSR.13 In our proof-of-principle experi-
ment, we analyzed the electrical signal from the photodiode with a
radiofrequency spectrum analyzer (the results are not shown in this
paper), and we found that the FSR was approximately 4-kHz wide. By
looking at the radiofrequencies close to 20 kHz, which represents a
multiple of five of the FSR, we observed that a change of 2% in laser
length (1 km) brings a frequency shift of 0.4 kHz, which is a multiple
of five of a 2% change in FSR. This confirmed the point made above.
The proposed RFSKEprotocol enables one towrite bits of information
into physical hertz of the spectrum with an efficiency that can be
higher than that of laser cryptographic systems based on a random
hopping of the laser optical central wavelength.3 In our implementa-
tion of the scheme, the numerical Fourier transform replaces the more
classical physical heterodyne beating to detect the hopping in central
frequency arising from a change in cavity length. Since the state of the
laser is stored in an equivalent radiofrequency bandwidth, with the
RFSKE scheme, the available optical bandwidth can be fully utilized to
make multiple pairs of users sharing a common fiber link and using
different laser channels work in parallel.
The buffer of our analog-to-digital converter has a size of 20 000
readings, corresponding to a temporal window of 20 ms. In principle,
such a temporal window would allow for random generation and
reading of 50 laser states per second, although one has to set apart
some time for the laser transients (the round trip light time in the
cavity is 0.24 ms). We tested the reliability of our coding/decoding
process by randomly generating 2000 laser states and reading the
electrical output signal from the photodiode. Figure 3 shows the col-
lected data as Fourier transforms. Bright colors in the graph indicate
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Figure 2 Optical spectra of the UFL for the four states. Top panel: the black solid
curve is for state (0,0); the red dashed curve is for state (1,1). Bottom panel: the
blue solid curve is for state (0,1); the green dashed curve is for state (1,0). The
laser central wavelength is 1560.5 nm and its 3-dB bandwidth is 0.11 nm. UFL,
ultralong fiber laser.
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Figure 3 Short-time numerical Fourier transform of the output readings of 2000
experimentally generated random states of the laser. The figure is subdivided into
four panels, showing the output results conditioned by the random choice of one
of the four possible states.
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likely situations. For ease of reading, the data are grouped in four sets,
each being conditioned by one of the four possible random choices set
by the computer. The data set conditioned by the choice of the (0,0)
state clearly shows a persistence of the highest intensity around the
frequency 20.4 kHz: the presence of a local maximum of intensity
around this frequency can then be used as an indicator to identify
the state. Similarly, the longest laser length used for the (1,1) state
causes a contraction of the FSR and pinpoints the position of the
fifth-order radiofrequency tone at 19.6 kHz. The bottom panels in
Figure 3 show the results when the input states (1,0) and (0,1) are
selected: in both cases the fifth-order radiofrequency tone is located at
20 kHz, thereby giving the two states the same radiofrequency sig-
nature. Alice and Bob can remove this ambiguity by tracing the opera-
tion modes of their switches. We also note that in the region of
radiofrequency spectrum being studied, the frequency shifts of the
spectral tones exceed the tone’s bandwidths. This enables the imple-
mentation of a simple decision algorithm.
The decision step is also of critical importance for a fast evaluation
of the FSR. Once the 20 000 samples were received and Fourier trans-
formed, the strategy that we adopted to detect the FSRwas again based
on monitoring the fifth harmonic of the signal spectrum, as this
proved to be effective in our case. We evaluated the spectral intensities
p1, p2 and p3 of the signal I(t) at the respective frequencies 20.4 kHz,
20 kHz and 19.6 kHz, thereby generating a triplet of values (p1, p2, p3)
for each data acquisition. The compliance bandwidth of the spectral
profiles was 0.2 kHz. Each reading and signal processing operation can
be represented as a point in the three-dimensional space of the (p1, p2,
p3) parameters which plays the role of a constellation diagram, as
shown in Figure 4. If p1.p2.p3, a decision is made in favor of the
longest possible laser cavity (0,0 state). Similarly, the condition
p1,p2,p3 identifies the shortest cavity (1,1 state). The two states
(0,1) and (1,0) are in principle indistinguishable since they both attain
the same frequency position, as also shown in Figure 3. In our mea-
surements, we kept track of the random number generated by the
computer so that an error occurred when a wrong decision was made.
Two thousand laser states were generated randomly, and 98.95% of
these were correctly detected. The results obtained are summarized in
Figure 4. Different laser states are rendered with points of different
colors by the random number generator: black indicates the (0,0)
state, red is for the (1,1) state, blue is for (0,1) and green is for (1,0).
The distinguishability of the symbols at the receiver is visualized in this
constellation diagram by the net distinction among the point clouds of
the same color (corresponding to the same switch settings). An error
would be visualized in the diagram as a point of a different color from
the surrounding cloud. The indistinguishability of the secure bit states
from the perspective of an external eavesdropper is visualized by an
overlap of the blue and green clouds: in this volumetric region the
probability of Eve confusing the (0,1) state with the (1,0) state is very
close to the ideal case of 50% (i.e., no knowledge of the key). Such a
probability is drastically reduced for the legitimate users since they can
keep track of their own random choice; this fact is represented in the
diagramby the coexistence of the two color clouds in the same volume.
We would like to note that the time-domain fluctuations of the laser
induce changes of several orders of magnitude in the elements of the
triplets, and such values are plotted on a logarithmic scale.
Limitation of current set-up and future perspectives
Figures 2 and 3 reveal that there are some residual differences between
the (0,1) and (1,0) states in both the optical and the radiofrequency
domains. These differences stem from the different light losses associ-
ated with the two states as well as from the different responses of the
two switches. To counteract these problems, Alice and Bob could
include additional ad hoc components into their set-ups. While the
discussion of all available solutions is beyond the scope of this paper,
Figure 2 highlights that a way to remove detectable differences in the
optical spectra of the laser is to use in-cavity narrowband filtering.
In our scheme, the key exchange rate between Alice and Bob is
fundamentally limited by the number of light round trips that are
necessary to obtain a clear signature of the cavity modes - the exact
number of required round trips may vary depending on the type of
signal processing and/or optical amplification used. A way to obviate
this problem would be to exploit the available optical bandwidth in
full: with this in mind, we shifted the laser central wavelength from
1560.5 nm to 1560.7 nm (the results are not shown in this paper) by
manually tuning the in-cavity narrowband optical filter. The 3-dB
optical bandwidth of the laser was 0.06-nm wide at 1560.7 nm. We
verified that at the new central wavelength, the corresponding radio-
frequency spectrum still allowed the lasing states to be correctly
detected with a 98% success rate: as expected, the RFSKE is independ-
ent of the optical bandwidth filled up by the laser. These results con-
firm the potential of extending the proposed RFSKE scheme to a
parallel cascade laser configuration in which each ofM lasers operates
at a different central wavelength: Alice and Bob would then operateM
subsystems centered at different wavelengths and connected to the
common public network fiber by multiplexers/demultiplexers. The
transmission speed would increase by a factor of M in such case. It
is also worth noting here that, since Alice and Bob are in control of the
activemediumof the laser as well as of the frequency-dependent losses,
they could differentiate clockwise and counterclockwise propagations
in the ring cavity by using non-reciprocal devices such as circulators.
At the same time, they could attenuate the lasing intensities artificially
when they do not use the extra 1-km fiber loop. This way, Eve would
not be able to extract the information of (0,1) and (1,0) states by
monitoring the lasing intensities in both directions simultaneously.
In our experimental set-up, the optical losses associated with the bar
and cross modes of the switches cannot be separately controlled, in
particular the losses associated with the shortest cavity state of the laser
cannot be increased. Different switching technologies, such as those
based on fixed couplers and semiconductor or acousto-optic switches,
or Mach-Zehnder modulators, could be considered as to improve the
system operation.
Furthermore, a careful analysis of our system has revealed that the
two switches used in this experiment do not completely reject either
path. Consequently, when at least one of the switches is in crossmode,
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Figure 4 Constellation diagram summarizing the output readings of 2000 experi-
mentally generated random states of the laser. The red dots are for state (1,1), the
black dots are for state (0,0), the blue dots are for state (0,1) and the green dots
are for state (1,0).
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the radiofrequency spectrum of the laser features an additional peri-
odicity of 185 kHz, which can be viewed as the effect of a nested (or
compound) loop of approximate length 1.1 km.14 However, this fact
does not compromise our proof of concept: we indeed managed to
attain similar responses for the (0,1) and (1,0) states through fine
tuning of the control voltage of the switches. Incidentally, this fact
shows that a fraudulent addition of a nested loop to the system would
modify the radiofrequency spectrum of the laser, and it would be
unveiled by the (0,0) state in which neither Alice nor Bob use their
extra fiber segment. Real-timemonitoring of the radiofrequency spec-
trum extended to several orders of magnitude for frequency would be
desirable to check the integrity of the link and strengthen the system’s
security.
In this experiment, the data reading and decision-making time was
significantly longer than 20 ms since the microprocessing unit takes
about 10 s to send data out to the computer. In other words, the data
transmission process was longer than the laser transient caused by the
switching between cavity lengths. This may temporarily spoil or
degrade the signatures of the cavity modes by the signal I(t) due to
the erratic presence of time-domain fluctuations, which may explain
the observed 1%–2% error rate in the detection process. The laser
transients could be made shorter by using a different optical amplifica-
tion technology such as Raman or semiconductor amplification, or by
using optical modulators. Note that optical modulators or frequency
shifters may provide an alternative solution to the use of switches and
an extra segment of fiber in the system’s set-up. This principle has been
already discussed in the context of lasers for molecular diagnostics in
Refs. 6 and 7. In-cavity phase or frequencymodulators could be used to
obtain a fast varying spectrum,9 thereby confusing the optical detection
by Eve. The use of polarization scramblers could further improve the
system. Finally, the UFL–RFSKE scheme proposed in this paper could
be implemented within a linear laser cavity configuration as well.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a new approach to secret key exchange for laser
cryptography, and carried out a proof-of-principle demonstration of
this new concept. We have experimentally demonstrated, we believe
for the first time, how the radiofrequency spectrum of an UFL can be
used to establish a secure communication between two parties.
Although the demonstrated classical cryptographic scheme cannot
ensure the same security level than that provided by idealized
quantum key distribution systems, we believe that it represents an
interesting tradeoff solution to enforce the security of communication
systems beyond the standard software protocols and employing con-
ventional, off-the-shelf components. Our results open up new avenues
to studies involving non-traditional schemes for secure communica-
tions. In this paper, we have focused on the presentation of the basic
concept and the implementation aspects of the new approach. A secur-
ity analysis will be addressed in a future work. Furthermore, the radio-
frequency monitoring of an UFL can be of interest for applications in
diverse research fields, such as in distributed sensing.
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